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"A DOCUMENTARY. DRAMA" : The Case of. Malisela Letsoalo
the Banareng Tr;ibe versus iiisu Union Government,
Tuesday 28 January 1958 was a tepid 20.8*C in St George1a
Street, Cape Town. Wot far off, the Houses of Parliament
were considerably hotter. Generator of th is heat was none
other than the 'Famous Lawyer' and former Native Senator, Mr
Hyioan Meyer Basner. Basner had just bombarded every MP,
including the Senate, with copies of an affidavit rebutting
the Minister of Native Affairs' •attack upon his integri ty
the day before
The Senate had heard the Minister declare Easner responsible
for alleged " r io ts ox disturbances In Kamathola Location" in
June 1957. They could read, a day later , that Basner denied
this f lat ly. He did acknowledge an "incident" there on 3
June, "when a number of women. . .prevented the payment of £24
compensation for leaving Cthe Location] to the deposed
Ac11 iig Chief Ma 11 se 1 a Le tsoaID. " Basner added t'hat si nee
becoming legal adviser to the Mamathoia, whom the Union
Government intended removing from the Volkberg Location,
Agatha Forest, to the farm Meta near Tricharcltsdal, "no
poli t ical organisation, inst i tut ion . . . or individuals from
Johannesburg...have actively associated with or influenced
the Ma mat hoi a . . . (Banareng tribe) to refuse to leave, . . " . ' • ' • *
Basner threw himself into the legal defence of the Kamathola
wi th customary z'eal. Hy kept detailed f i l e s on developments,
collected sworn statements and made recommendations to his
clients which often precipi tated him and them into
confrontation with Native Affairs Department <.JKfAD)
o f f i c i a l s . His own his tory as a Communist Party organiser
and Native Senator plus considerable legal experience of
clef ending the ' v ic t ims ' of segregat ion and apar theid, had
given Basner grim appreciat ion of South Africa 1s governing
party, and in pa r t i cu l a r , i t s Minister of Native Affairs ,
Dr. K F Verwoerd. ''•*'••'
1. William Ballinger Papers. CVGB). University of Cape Town Archive, EC 347 C5.
V.1,1, Hyman Meyer Basner, Mamathola Location, "Affidavit", 27/1/1956. Phineas
Letsoalo, who worked at Kensington Golf Club, was a major 'source' on events in
Kamathola. dubbed Basner "The Famous Lawyer". Basner, born in Dvinsk, Latvia, in
1906, grew up in South Africa, and attended the University of California. His
legal career began in 1930. Ke immediately earned a reputation as "an
outstanding defender of African rights"- A member of the Communist Party, he
left in 1940, to protest the Soviet invasion of Finland. Zealously committed to
opposing- apartheid, he stood as a Native Senator in 1937 and was elected in
1942. ttfHE. "Obituary of Mr, K M Basner", The Times 3/5/1977. )
2. I must thank Mr. Basner's widow, Miriam (JIB.), his daughter, Mrs. Marcella
Bloom, for allowing me access to his papers, which will shortly be housed in the
Church of the Province of South Africa Archive, University of the Witwatersrand.
(.CFSA).
Cape Argus 23/1/1958, p. 1, col- 1. The two men were central figures in the
pitched battle, which dominated the 1953 Senate session. Government members were
aroused to support the tfamafhola Semoval, and Kative Senators and two renegade
United Party colleagues effectively cut off from the majority of the opposition.
Basner was always a history man; he wrote a short history of
the Mamathola, a long history of South Africa, and
considered the historical implications of the former to the
lat ter throughout the Mamathola case. *•" '-• •"  He hoarded
perhaps for posterity - the Mamathola papers, which form the
doc'.iiaentary basis of the case. The set of affidavits
submitted to the Supreme Court form a circular and self-
reflesive narrative, from which some dramatist might hack a
playsoript in which applicants and repondents retel1 the
tale of removal in varied, nuanced and idiosyncratic ways.
The^e documents are the basis • of this paper, and feed
outwards into the evidence which both Basner and Native
Senator Bal linger amassed, and the Senate, Assembly and ITAD
r eco rded . ' •''•:'
Verwoerd's accusations, made after he had submitted his
f i rs t replying affidavit, arose out of a turning point in
the case. The Mamathola, who had been "perfectly willing" to
go to Metz, suddenly refused a move of the "greatest benefit
one could imagine" for the tribe and the country, even if
those people f MamatholaJ did not grasp this. < 3 :'
The t r i b e maintained t h a t they had never agreed to go.
Verwoerd and h i s o f f i c i a l s bal ieved t h a t the presence of
Attorney, Basner, in the Chief•s kraa l had quickly helped
him to change h i s mind. I t maddened Verwoerd to th ink t h a t
h i s old foe, Basner, was, once again, s t i r r i n g up the
Nat ives . On 27 January 1958, Verwoerd l a b e l l e d Basner the
l i n k - p i n between h i s r u r a l c l i e n t s and the A1TC. By April
1953, he had banned Basner from v i s i t i n g h i s c l t e n t s '
p rospec t ive place of r e s e t t l e m e n t , Metz. '• '-••'•'
3.Basner Papers <HJ5£>» "Hamathola Location", "The tfamathola". HM Basner, "The
Black Price of South Africa Gold, 1870-1950", CPSA.
4.Chief documentary sources are in VGB and HM£. Basner's Papers are probably a
fraction of the documents be amassed over a lifetime. Some of his life-story has
been recorded: by his wife, Kir lain Basner, by Charles van Onselen, via
investigations into the social history of the South-Western Transvaal in the
1930s, and, indirectly, by Basner himself.
5. Senate Debates. 1953 <££> p. 703
6.Si), "Reference of Removal Crder to Sessional Committee, 27/1/195S, p.43.
Technically, Basner eluded the Supresslon of Communism Act's noose in 1950, but
Verwoerd sought ways of dealing with him, In 1950, he ordered an investigation
into Sasner's professional conduct in the Vitzieshoek Case. This culminated in
an unfruitful Law Society Inquiry into his conduct. (See SASH. JSTTS. If/A 943/400;
"Unprofessional Conduct, Attrny. K M Basner 19/2/1951, "Confidential let ter from
VWX Siselen to the Chief Native Commissioner, Western Areas, Potchefstroom."
Eiselen could not find enough information to justify the investigation. Also see
HMB. File 4) (The numbering of files in tjfifi. is tentative, as the papers are still unsorted),
C B Young, Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, to HMB, 10 April 1953.
Trying to d i v e r t Oppos i t ion a t t e n t i o n from HJAD's r a l e i n
Kamathola, the Min i s t e r vowed ominously t h a t lie saw the hand
of Basner in Headman Solomon L e t s o a l o ' s d e p o s i t i o n upon the
i>To.matilda' s p l i g h t ; " [ the d e p o s i t i o n ] ' Sabotft' s Vineyard1 i s
l u l l of shameless l i e s " , s a i d Verwoerd, '• '"•"'!
"If the framer [of the document] was not a Basner, then i t was
perhaps a Ballinger. If a Basner did not write i t , i t was
probably a Ballinger. . , " . t e : '
Given the a s s o c i a t i o n between Basner and Solomon L e t s o a l o ,
and the document' s wide d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t hey
did work t o g e t h e r on i t s p roduc t ion . Both found t he B i b l i c a l
p a r a l l e l of 'Nabcth ' s Vineyard1 d e p i c t e d t he a v a r i c e wi th
which Mamathoia was taken from i t s i n h a b i t a n t s , L e t s o a l C s
a f f i d a v i t and d e s c r i p t i o n of the a c t u a l removal show that, he
had no need of a g h o s t - w r i t e r . t: ••' '
Neve r the l e s s , B a s n e r ' s knowledge of the l ega l p r o c e s s of
d i s p o s s e s s i o n helped the L e t s o a l o family enormously. Ti-asner
co'old quote Commissions and S t a t u t e s , knew the South Afr ican
-Native Trust (SAJTT) ' s workings thoroughly and, was f a m i l i a r
with the g r i evances of r u r a l communities i n the Transvaa l
and OFS. '- ' - •'
7 ..Ibid, p. 50 See 3, D. Letsoalo " If a both's Vineyard", in EKE. and &G£. Verwoerd,
wrongly called Solomon Letsoalo the roan "whom they fondly call the present
chief, which he is not", (SI), 1953, p.50). Chief Hamathola (Malisela Letsoalo)
was Solomon's cousin. The state questioned the chief 's locus standi. He was
appointed Acting Chief in 1944, during his nephew, William1 s, perinanent
incapacity. MI) did not want to appear to be dealing unreasonably with the
Chief, by deposing him in under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, The Maraathaia
certainly feared incorporation into the newest alternative to democratic
representation: separate, state-controlled Bantu Authorities. The ' weeding out1
of uncooperative chiefs was ' necessary' to make Bantu Authorities work. As the
Prime Minister said in 1959, (Hansard, col 6513); "vie have the choice of either giving the
n/iiiles their o»n territory and the Bantu theirs, OP of giving everybody one state and seeing the
Bantu govern.11 (see DHSA, II 411), Also D. Posel, "The Construction of Apartheid,
1943-1901, Conference Paper, "South Africa in the 1950s", ICS, Oxford, ±987.
6. £H. 1953,p,51. As their Senate Representative, Ballinger had been the
Mamathola's f irst confidant (or, in the Minister's words, "fellow inciter". (SDt
1958, p.54.) In 1950, when NAC (1948-52, p. 13) called for their removal, the
Tribe contacted him via their f i rs t lawyers, Webster, Punbar and Saner, He had
not had much success in the House, or in l e t t e r s to Verwoerd and the Secretary
for HA, W M Siselen, CKSE. passim).
Basner's 1937 and 1943 campaigns showed the increasing response of the African
electorate to his views on rural matters. See(iifi£, 6C 347 C2 111,3,1 "H,H. Basner: The
Candidate of African National Unity, ft Call to Africans"; (QS., p.163 &'173)
9. See EM, and W££ EC 347 C5 V.1.3; ££, p. 725
10. In 1942, Basner attacked the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act which made
Africans rent-paying tenants of SAFT. His manifesto proclaimed:
THE AFRICAN FSOPLH GOT NO LAUD. The Chiefs have no control whatsoever over
Trust Land. Up to August 1941, the Native Trust bought 1,491,739 margen of
'released1 land. This, for six and a half million people, dependant [sic] for
their living on land, Who got this land? How is i t administered?
50 CHIEF, 2!0 TRIBE, SO INDIVIDUAL AFKICAE GOT THIS LAND,
<MQ£, BC 347 C 2 . I I I . 3 . 2 . 1 , HMB, "To the African E l e c t o r a t e of the Transvaal and
OFS", Johannesburg, 1942). See a l s o (SA3E, ITS. 39/362 (£40) (1), Rep re sen t a t i on
of Nat ives Act, 1930; 1942 E l e c t i o n s , 10/9/1942, "Open l e t t e r fram*HTCB t o RJ".
For RJ' s vi^ws on the Land Act, see Faul Kich White Power and the L ibe ra l
Conscience (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1934), p . 5 1 .
II.
A year before the l'SSS Senate Debate, on 13 January 1957,
Verwoerd castigatd those who had "whipped up" the Mamathola
Removal "into a world affair." Verwoerd' s public statements,
usually made within the confines of a parliament in which
the National Party was rapidly getting the better of the
United Party, were decidedly adversarial. The question of
what to do about rural conditions affecting erosion, African
farming and white fax~raing, weighed heavily upon him. The NP
had inherited the UP's inadequate agrarian policies, such as
the planned Mania thai a removal, and were, in terras of their
promises to rule the country, bound to make pol icy work,
somehow.
UP Native Affairs Commissions (NAO had proposed, and the
1954 Toralinson Commission endorsed the reasons for removing
the Mamathola:
(.a) That the occupation of the farm Muckle Glen by the Banareng
Tribe menaces the sources of the Letsitele River.
<b) That the Mamathola Location is too small and that there is
no future for the tribe in the. present location. * ' ' ?
Verwoerd commented, irritably that this was a very ordinary
sort of removal which "^v^ry government had to do when
necessary, and the NF only stood accused of being too
reasonable" towards the Natives. '• ' -:i: '•' Senator J. M. Conrad ie
spoke for the UP when he accused Verwoerd of bungling the
case. The UP approved of the removal in principle, but not
"the way [ it] is being carried out" , '•' ' "•* '•'
For a "very ordinary removal", Verwoerd became extremely
involved in the case, perhaps using it as a chance to
vindicate or vilify his Ministry. The previous October, he
been compelled to meet the tribe1s Chief and Councillors to
change the proposed removal -site from Fartilis farm, to
Katz. This sharp turnabout indicated that, NAD had decided
that the wet weather would make tha Fertilis move costly and
impracticable. Vi thout allowing the mask of father, leader
and baas to si ip, Verwoerd skillfully dug into the SANT' s
store of Transvaal land and pulled out another two
"excel lent" farms: Me*tz and Strassburg, near Leydsdorp. '' ' * •'
The next eight months produced a set of highly controversial
events. In his* first affidavit, Verwoerd asserts that the
Kamathola expressed, on many occasions, their willingness to
ll.SSS. Clippings, 1948-1960, 13/1/57, Rand Daily Mail "Tribe Removal Whipped Up
Propaganda" VG3f BC 347 C5 V.2.1.1: SD Letsoalo, "Naboth's Vineyard", p.3
The 4 United Party commissions wer«: Native Affairs Commission 1937; Native
Reclamation Committee, 1937/3; Interdepartmental Committee of NAD and Forestry,
1944; Native Affairs Commission, 1948. The Affidavits of Dr Verwoerd and CB
Young, Secretary of NA, filed in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the
Supreme Court set out JTAD's conception of the case. See also HKB, 16/9/57,
Affidavit of HF Verwoerd, p.6.
12.m&> Clippings, 1948-60: 13/6/1557, Cape Times. "Tribe will be Forced tc
Move",
13.HOB, Clippings, 1943-60: 15/5/57, ££&.
14,Eventually, the Kamathola moved to Metz and Enable, another adjoining farm.
See discussion of 5 October Meeting below.
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g-o to Metz. The Chief and. his councillors deny that they
ever did. A lone voice, ' rapidly being ejected from their
midst, one T Rakoma, insisted that the Mamathola were
initially Keen to move. In all the 'government' versions,
the event that turned the Chief into a ' rebel' , Basner' s
arrival, in medias res at Metz on 3 June. For Chief and
Councillors, Basner's presence was crucial: he advised them
that they did not have to go passively to Metz. He allowed
them to articulate their own 'history as a strong argument
against HAP's removal strategy. To this argument, he j oined
his own Knowledge of rural conditions and government
p o l i c y , '- ' '"' •'
When Basner replaced Ballinger as their advisor, the
Mamathoia were better able to do legal battle against the
state. In 1950, their first attorneys had asked Ballinger to
intercede with NAD on their behalf. Ballinger had ferried
letters between the two parties for the next seven years.
Yet, his intercessions little deterred HAD' s plans to remove
the tribe, first to Mafefe and then, to Fertilis. Verwoerd's
quarrels with the Ballingers roused desultory parliamentary
and press interest in the case. NAD preceded, unhindered
despite doubts within the ranks of its northern Transvaal
personel. Ballinger's cautiously expressed "doots" fell on
the deaf ears of Verwoerd and Eiselen.
The two prior removal sites generated complex departmental
investigation, correspondence and report. When Mafefe proved
inadequate, Fertilis was substituted, despite obvious
shortcomings. Neither the tribe's nor Ballinger's protests
changed Verwoerd'a mind about Fertilis as quickly as the
cost of the rain did. '' IC:' Within days of this calculation,
Xe tz was inserted into the inexorable narrative of Ad Hoc-
reports and findings attendant on K"AD' s removal plans.
As a Native Senator, caught up in Parliamentary procedure,
Ballinger had less recourse to posi tive action than did
Basner, to whom the relative independeu.ee of the judicial
system was available. It is likely that their differing
temperaments and pol i t ical persuasi ons ma.de them br i ng
different amounts of energy to the case. This point is
difficult to 'prove', and it is hard to avoid the kind of
historical ventriloquism which allows the labels
1
 liberalism' and 'radicalism' to drown out their actual
positions in this regard. Both men were, in the event,
equally unable to halt the removal.
Basner's contribu tion was to fight NAD's plans to remove
both people and their pasts. He, and to a lesser extent,
Ballinger, actively collected the narratives of
dispossession, threat and removal which the Mamathola sent
him. In co-operation with the tribe, he extracted
meticulously detailed affidavits in which set out the
15.Hotti the references in affidavits; See HQS, Clippings 1943-60: 4/6/1957,
Star: A senior headman told The Star that the Mamathola "...had no alternative
but to move. . , Ve do not want to go to Metz, where the area is entirely
undeveloped". They also remarked on the chief's ambivalence. The Star, it must
be noted, often repeated government accounts of the removal.
16.&ASE, UTS, HA 8/423, 17/9/1956, CKC, Pietersburg to Sec. of IT A.
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s account of the removal. The lawsuit also
produced the equally detailed, but opposing government
account of the case. When Verwoerd declared, six months
later that he saw the hand of Basner in Solomon Letsoalo1 s
deposi t i on, he was not a11 ogethe r wrong.
The affidavits are couched in the highly stylised language
of the courts. Clearly Basner, various Commissioners of
Oaths and the state1s lawyers were responsible for rendering
the statements of Chief, Councillors and NAD officials in
this idiom. The resulting documents are solemn, but retain a
sense of character and the urgency of the case to both
sides. One has only to interleave the conflicting
allegations of applicant and respondent to breath a kind of
pasthunous reality into these characters. Indeed, a
playwright might make of them a courtroom drama. For an
historian, the documents lead into the drama of the case,
and into further documents and ' oral evidence ancilliary to
it.
One could begin the narrative at many points; this paper
begins with the turning point meeting between Verwoerd and
the tribe's representatives at Metz on. 5 October 1956, The
reinovsti had been delayed, Verwoerd said, because the
Mamathola had suddenly changed their .minds and refused to
leave their location. !: ' ;':>
III
M a U s e l a L e t s o a l o a n d t h e 15 c o u n c i l l o r s of t h e B a n a r e n g
T r i b e , o r M a m a t h o l a , r e c e i v e d f o r m a l n o t i c e t o a t t e n d t h e
m e e t i n g . '' ';iil ' I t s e e m e d t o C o u n c i l l o r Manas Maponya t h a t
17.SH, 775/1957, p.5942
13-iLKLB, 2/10/1956, Notice from Addi t iona l WC's Office to Mal i se la , Solomon,
Rufus and William Le t soa lo , p l u s Manas Maponya,Phineas Makwela, Thomas Eakoma
and o t h e r s .
Kaffiathola (1364 or 1749 raorgen) i s scheduled in the 1913 Nat ives Land
Art. <Tteviseri S t a t u e s of thp. Union of SA. v o l . 1 1 , 1913-1916, p .312 . ) In 1941 SANT
took over the l o c a t i o n . ( R e g i s t r a r of Deeds, Dept of Fubl ic Vorks and Land
A f f a i r s , Cen t ra l Govt Of f i ces , P ta , " C e r t i f i c a t e of Reg i s t e r ed T i t l e So. 20341",
15 ftov. ( in the year of our Lord) 1941. Also see Report of the Native Affa i r s
Commission. M £ 1949-1952, , p. 17)
JTJ. van Varmelo, I n f l u e n t i a l Government E t h n o l o g i s t , surveyed the area in 1944,
Ha used the Lovedu-ised Sepedi unique to the Mamathola evidence of t h e i r
' e t h n i c ' u n i t y , which Verwoerd s a i d he wished t o main ta in . (See ££>, 1958)
He found t h a t t h e Banai eng had l i v e d in t h e i r ' l o c a t i o n ' s i nce the 1680s
( l o c a t i o n s were only s e t up in 1907, see 1st A p p l i c a n t ' s Replying A f f i d a v i t ) .
The MAC set the population at 1200-2000 people.CU. of SA, Department of Native Affairs, Ethnological
Publications No, 10, 1344, NJ van Warmelo, 6ovt Ethonologist, "The Ba Letswalo or Banarene", p.7,)
Viii Warmelo supports the tribe's hereditary claims to their land, He traced the Banareng back seven
generations. They had moved from the BaUodi area, near Sabie, to the Wolkberg above New Agatha
Forest under their fourth chief, Podile, Volatile Northern Transvaal politics may have brought
together a variety of ethnic identities under the quite recent name, Maroathola, 'flamathola* herseif
became chief in the ISSOs, She was imprisoned in Pretoria for her-involvement in- Chief tfak;<ob?.'s
war against the Boers US94) and released during the British occupation of Pretoria, 1902, Chief
•lalisdla Letsoalo was her grandson,
On the region's ethnic complexity, see J,0, Krige "Traditional origins and tribal relationships of
the Sotho of the Northern Transvaal" in Bantu Studies IX 342-4,
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Verwoerd15 promises won the tribe1 s support: the removal
would not take place until NAD had erected a large tribal
school, churches, post office, and hospital had at Ketz.
Each family would receive a residential and a farming
allotment of IVi margen. The farm would contain a location, a
township for the 'wealthy' , grazing and arable land.
Verwoerd also promised the tribe 47 morgen of citrus trees
to lure them from their prolific trees at Mamathola.
Compensation itself was not discussed. The Minister' s trump
card was the postponement of the removal until 30 June 1957.
The promised benefits so pleased the Mamathola that they
a>:-ked to sing the national anthem and " ' Morena boioka
setshaba sa ,sresu •",<'' -• •'
19-HOE, BC 347 C5 V 2.3.16, 15/10/1956, M. Maponya for Chief Kamahlola and Tribe
to VGB.
Kaponya's account gives the impression that the tribe
welcomed, the new site and conditions af removal. NAD shared
this impression. C.B. Young, Undersecretary for Native
Affairs, came away certain of victory. He told Ballinger
that, "some of the tribesmen have requested to translocate
. . .as soon as possible" and that he considered the case
finalised. ' • ^ " :>
Malisela and Solomon Letsoalo and the Banareng Tribe, the
Applicants in the Case against the Union Government did not
share Maponya' s view of the meeting. The Chief, as First
Petitioner, did not dispute the fact that on 5 October,
Verwoerd hasi summoned him and councillors to Mets, and set
the move for 30 June 1957. But, said the Chief, NAD had
never asked the tribe's opinion on the new site, even though
they had always opposed the removal. *•z-"• '•'
The Chief further denied that negotiations with NAD had ever
been cordial. Rather, NAD had been pressurising the tribe to
move to Mampa since 1950. Then, after 5 October 1956,
relatively powerful local NAD officials, Davis, Weitz, Young
and Prinsloo had exorted them to go to Xet-z. He added,
probably upon his attorney's advice, that the Minister was
too afraid of publicity to get- an order in terms of Section
5 (1> bis of the Native Administration Act of 1927 to remove
them legally. *- *:: 1:;'
This reference -to the Act laay have been Basner's way of
forcing the Minister' s hand. He knew that Verwoerd had no
desire to appeal to both Houses of Parliament, as the Act
required. This request might bring a few pungent skeletons
out of the NAD closet. Hitherto, arguments about
conservation, the condition of the Re-serve, the payment of
compensation and the removal of schools, pensions and post
office, had largely been confined to tribe and NAD. If the
case were to be argued in parliament, every articulate
Native Representative and UP member might use it to hang the
Government's haphazard attempts at rural apartheid. Whether
all parties were aware or not, the Chief was making a
forcing bid. Verwoerd felt compelled to play his hand;
which, however, proved ultimately stronger than the Chief's.
The way in which NAD dealt with this removal suggests that,
at the time, Vyrwoerd and his officials did not actual ly
know the strength of their hand. Deborah Posel and John
Lazar ha"e found that apartheid's planners were in a
somewhat experimental phase during the 1950s. They appeared
to treat cases in an Ad Hoc fashion, rather than applying
the 'protocol' of same grand design. The wavering,
blustering and temporary gap-stopping of the Mamathoia
Removal is a case in point. • ••:-":i '
BC 347 C5 V 2.3.17, 16/10/1956, CB Young to WGB
1st AHA, paras.5b+c.
22. [1KB, 1st AKA, paras. 9,10, & 17.
23. See D. Posel, Op Cit p. 5, and J. Lazar, "Verwoerd versus the
"Visionaries"; The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA? and
Apartheid, 1943-1961".
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Varwoerd's own explanations of NAD's sudden preference for
Ke Lz over Fer t i l i s were never very consistent. On 12 June,
ne used the rainfall argument to justify his department' s
actions to the Senate. C-. B. Young, perhaps to reassure the
public that Trust money was not being wasted on useless
farms for Africans, added that " . . we could make use of
Fer t i l i s . . . fo r other t r ibes in that immediate vicinity". To
highlight the success of the new choice, Verwoerd, quoting
Young, added that the t r i b e ' s acceptance of Met2 ".. .was
greater than w» have ever experience in connection with
removals...Like a male choir they sang psalms and hyms ts ic]
of gratitude. . . i t came spontaneously . . . on the grounds of
their, own appreciation 01 the area. " *=*•*•>
Three months later, Verwoerd, in his 'guiding father'
per&ona, stated, more magnanimously that the t r i be ' s pleas
to avoid Fer t i l i s had moved him to give them Mets. His
replying affidavit, (endorsed toy C.B. Young), said that he
had met the Tribe at Metz on 5 October because they Jiacl
stsk&d to see him. Young and Verwoerd again said they
understood the hymn-singing to signify the t r i b e ' s
"plea-sure" . '• •':**:? The senior NAD men al l shared this opinion.
In S.J, Davis, Chief Native Commissioner CCNCJ,
Pietersburg1 s», opinion, " . . . het hui le met gejuig hul le
bert-iidwi 11 igheid te keime gegee oin van Mamathola na Ket2 t e
ver^leuif. " t:; ''•'' The Acting NC, Tzaneen, F. W. VaHz ' s ,
descr ipt ion glowed s t i l l more; on 5 October , he had. asked
the chief and counci l lors if they had any further quest ions.
They had said nob. "Alnictl van die na ture ! Iw daar was baie
bl y omda t hulle na Me tz Icon gaan, en hu 1 gesi g t e het
gestr&al en somiuige liet van dankbaarheicl gehuil" . '• •:-'y •' The
more j uni01 tli« o f f i c i a l , the more glow! ng h is r spor t . The
more glowing tine report , the more the Senior of f i c i a l s
chorussed their Approval of i t ,
Thy Chief denied Lhai he had aver entered a "solemn
undertaking" with the Minister to move to Metz. Although NAD
o f f i c i a l s had t r ieds inoe 1950 to compel him to move to
24, For the other removals in the area at this time, see SAIRR: A Survey of
Race Relations: 1954-5. p.128. By 1955,, 9 black spots in the Transvaal, 14 in
the Cape arid 1 in Hatal had beevi eliminated; a further 31 were scheduled for
removal. The Tomlinson Report <19553 made this picture far more serious: 154
"black spots", 75 in latai, 54 In the Transvaal, 20 in the Cape and 4 in the
OFS. (see the Survey, 1955-5, pp.157. For other removals and adjustments to
the 1935 Native Trust and Land Act, seeSAIRR: A Survey of Race Relations:,
1955-6. p. 153-4, sumroai-y of Native Trust and Land Amendment Act, Uo. 73 of
1950.
25.H51S. 16/9/1957, 1st RRA, p.15, "...in view of the fact that they were not
prepared to cciae to the Fertilis group of farms, I had decided that they need
not go there anymore and that they would be allowed to go to Metz if they were
willing to do so.". Also 17/9/1957, 1st SEA, Ax. B: CBY Affid, para. 12 61 Ax.
Bl, CBY's Speech ftotes, 1957,
20.H3E, 1st SA, AK.D, 17/9/1957, S.-J, Davis Affid. , until 30/4/1957, CNC,
Pietersburg, (later Undersecretary, UA, Bantu Education),,
27.HHE, 1st RA, Ax.E, 4/9/1957, P.V. Weitz's Affid., Acting UC Tzaneen, 1953-
195(5 and Jan to Kay, 1957. See 1st ARA, , para. 26 <d'>, The Chief denies that
any of his subjects wept.
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(Fe r t i l i s e , he would not. He denied t e l l i ng Young, Davis, of
We i t 2 that he would lead the t r ibe there "with his k ier ie" .
He had changed his mind" after learning that the t r ibe , who
had i n i t i a l l y thought they had no choice but to accept Metz,
had learnt that they could, legally, refuse to go. Verwoerd,
fo; $AD, denied that they thought there was no al ternat ive,
TLa Chief added that the whole t r ibe , bar the Rakomas - who
were not real ly of the t r ibe - refused to go, Thus the
refusal was a communal one, and not s t i r r ed up by agi ta tors
as NAD believed. Those who accepted Metz, the Chief said,
were colluding with the government, r •-'<='• *
These differing- in terpre ta t ions may have been contingent on
the diffr ing in te res t s of applicants and respondents. But a
certain amount of 'disinformation' was also abroad. This was
spread by NAD's man among the Mamathola, Headman Thomas
Kakoma. He gave the court important information. On 5
October, the Mamathoia ' v i s i t o r s ' to Metz, had found a group
of 'na t ives ' residing on the i r prospective home, Metz. These
were Bakoni squat ters and farm labourers who had been told
on 17 August to vacate Metz. To NAD's chagrin, they refused
to leave the farm they claimed was twice-promised (to them
and the Mamathola). The Mamathola took the opportunity to
question them about the farms Metz and Strassburg. The
Bakoni advised them to choose the larger, f l a t t e r Metz. ''• ::il-J '•'
The Chief l a t e r cited the plight of these squatters as
further reason for refusing Metz: the Mamathoia had no wish
to dispossess others, while themselves being dispossessed.
The Chief himself endorsed Rakoiua1 s evidence about the
Bakefti, but denied that the Mamathola had made Rakoma their
spokesperson. All the applicants denied that, after the
Minister 's 'promises' , Rakoma asked and' got Malisela and
Solomon Letsoaio's agreement to move. IJ'e ver thless , th i s was
the message that Rakotna fai thfully bare to Verwoerd.
a shed some 1ight upon singing. He declared that a
fellow Rakoma, Lutheran Rev. Moses, had risen and told the
tribe; "As we have nothing more to say we cannot simply go.
Let us rise and sing Nkosi oingelela kit ika [sic]" . The
Chief obiiged, while a photograph was taken of him, and the
tribe 'spontaneously' sang, as Ver woerd said, "1 ike a male
choir".
Thomas added that, at the tribal meeting some days later,
the Ma mat ho la. were so grateful not to have to go to Mampa
C Fertilisl , that they had accepted Mets. Rakoma had heard
Solomon Letsoalo himself say often: "If the Government could
give us any other places tnan Mampa we sha11 be satisiied."
28. HUB, "1st ASA,", para.10 & 21. Also Respondent's "Further Replying
Affidavit", (FSRAi para.21. Annex. 31/01?/02?/1958, CBY'sAfiid.
29,EUS£ "1st ARA", Ax. C, 11/10/1957, M F Monyeke's Affid., swore that about 50
families of BakQni squatters and farm labourers had lived on Kstz (Ms own
birthplace) "as long as I can remember". Verwoerd had few qualms about
disrupting the Bakoni's ethnic cohesion and farming methods. (Affidavit sworn
before N, Mandela, Commissioner of Oaths.
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The implications of revealing that Rev. Rakoma had conducted
the t r i b e ' s spontaneity maynot have struck Thomas, The
Kakoinas' enemies might, and did, cal l t h i s a consummately
skil led piece of po l i t i ca l manipulation. The Chief s
Councillors also noted the Reverend's conducting, but t h i s
was not in i t se l f sufficient proof of the Rakomas'
collusion. ': •*:io:i
Yst the t r ibe had i t s own ways of knowing that the Rakomas
were with the government. The fact that the Rakomas had been
offered rewards for thei r services to NAD was bad enough.
But there was a deeper sense of betrayal which the t r ibe
attr ibuted to the prior category of ethnici ty; the chief
said on oath that the Rakomas were not of the Banareng
Tribe. When the chief heard that some HT' '""hers of the t r ibe
were prepared to move on 3 June, he concluded;
that the Rakomas, who are not members of the tribe, although
resided in Karaathala Location, had decided'to move on 3 June 1957,
as I knew that the Rakomas had been having secret meetings with
the NC, Tzaneen,
The growing conflict had worn i t s e l f a deep course for
i tself in the old channel of ethnic fracture. ' - 3 1 •'
The Rakomas collusion and i t s consequences i l l u s t r a t e the
ways in which WAD exploited existing or potential dissent
within the community. The Minister* s Replying Affidavit
containing Rakoma1 s al legations must have reached Basner on
either 19 or 20 September. The ensuing exchange of
affidavits, . largely dealing with the issues Rakoma had
raisd, caused the t r i a l date, set for 29 August, to be
postponed many times. '• ••:;-:'-: '•' Basner submitted the Fi rs t
Applicant' s Replying Affidavit on 16 October. In th i s , the
Chief t r ied to explain why the t r ibe had not objected to
Metz on 5 October: he r i t e ra ted that they had not been asked
:. he Lr opinion of Met a, and thought that they had no choice
"but to accept i t . He t r ied to explaing the tribe* s behaviour
in terms of the 'custum' that i t was "impolite and
disrespectful" to "enter into open dispute with a high
personage such as the Minister" . No meraberof the t r ibe , he
averred, would have expressed sat isfaction before taking the
matter to a t r ibal meeting. (Chief and councillors denied
that the subsequent t r ibal meet ing had asked Ballinger to
te l l V-ii woerd they would not go to Ifetz, • ••*:* •'> Their reprieve
30.EKE, SKA., Ax. F, 3/9/1957, Affid, Sekiki Thomas Eakoma paras. 0-13, trans.
Rev. Moses Raltoma, 13/9/1957 at Puiwelskloof. "The male choir" featured in
Verwoerd's quotations from CBY, Senate Speech, 12/0/1957; "Kampa" describes
Fertilis, covered with weeds "a deadly place unfit for human occupation", see
"1st ASA.", paras 9 & 10.
31.SSS, "1st AEA" , para. 5a & e.
32.See HJffi. 7/9/1957, 22/5/1957; 16/11/1957 and 2/12/1957.
33.2QE BC C5 V 4.9, PL to VGB, begs for legal advice. U&B_, "1st AR Affid",
16/10/1957, para.5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 21, & 26.
The Councilicrs submitted an Affidavit in October 1957; William Letsoalo,
Jacob Kakgakga, Manas Maponya, Rut us Letsoalo, Elia Rapela, John Machabe, Fiat
Mapbnya and Johannes Kodipane all swore that the Tribe had never decided to
leave Hetz, and denied all assertions to the contrary.
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from Mai&pa was the only cause of their j ubilation, the
Councillors said; they felt no such emotion about Metz. ':;-:!'1 -'•'
The fact that this affidavit was taken aftr the Rakomas had
moved to Mets to receive their promised traing rights
probably made the Chief insist even more firmly that Thomas
.Rakoma, not being one of there, would never have been chosen
to spea.k for the tribe, and had never done so, in the
chief s presence. Moreover, the .Minister and not the tribe
had postponed the removal to June.
After the crucial disagreement of 5 October 1956, both
parties, NAD and the Karaathola proceeded according to their
own idea of what had taken place on this day. By early
November, the Mamathola had declared they would not move to
Met •z. Instead, they tried to negotiate their way into
another government remedy for African farming: betterment
scheme in their own location. This solution might satisfy
both parties: the scheme (cheaper than removal) would stem
the erosion of soil and water resources, while allowing the
tribe to remain in their home. But the government wheels
were already in motion: Forestry Department Officials
arrived on 7 November to say that they were "taking this
Location for afforestation" . ' :IJEl'1 Ballinger, . who hadvisited
Mamathola on 6 November, conveyed the Chief s complaints to
Verwoerd. '•' 3f:-- :>
IV.
Throughout the summer months of 1955/7, the Maraathola l ived
under the t h r e a t of removal. Location p o l i t i c s became 'mare
po la r i sed . Phineas L e t s o a l o ' s l e t t e r s , dscribed how tension
permeated da i l y l i f e . From Verwoerd' s point of view, tension
increased because the p ress "whipped the matter up" . ':::::'l!!:i;i The
Chief contemplated legal ac t ion agains t the threy Kakomas,
(Rev, Moses, t eache r s Athanasius and Joseph) encouraging the
move,
The Chief, via Phineas accused BF Lizamore, the ETC, Tzaneen,
of s l i p p i n g Moses £300 to lead h i s t r i b e to the promisd
Metz. For t h i s , the Rakoraas were promised so le t rad ing
r i g h t s in Metz. The outraged Chief wanted to sue the
contumacious Rakomas for £150, £100 and £150 each and expel
34. HUB., Councillors' Affidavit, paras. 3 « 4. -•
35.KGS, BC 34? C5 V 2.3.24, 3 /11/1956, Chief Mamahlola Si Tribe to VGB.
The Trust continued to control 'Bantu' land rights and administer betterment
policies within the Bantu Areas. The political upheavals throughout the
Transvaal and OFS in the 1940s and 1950s, indicated the African reception of
betterment.See the Tomlinson Commission Report. p.70, 74, 137. J. Yawitch
Betterment; The myth of Homeland Agriculture. (Johannesburg: SAIRE, 1981)
pp. 9-26, points out that the periods before and after the 1951 Bantu
Authorities Act should be considered distinct. This Act tightened the
betterment provisions (Proclamations 31 of 1939 and 116 of 1949) and sought to
co-opt chiefs into NA administration of agricultural improvement.
36.HQE, BC 347 C5 V 2.3-14, 12/11/, (October crossed out), VGB to Chief;
V.GB. EC 347 C5 V 2.3.13, 12 (misdated October)/11/1956, VGB to Verwoerd.He did
not protest; he merely summarised the Chief's letter, so that the Minister
could not accuse him of stirring. (39) Also, HUB, "1st ASA", Ax, B.
37.V£3_, Clippings, 1948-60, 13/1/1957, SDK.
them from Kamathola. Next, Joseph Rateoma, using an OHMS
envelope, wrote threateningly to Salomon Letsoalo from the
TTC's very office. Joseph, who, phineas alleged, "had been
told to hypnotize the' chief" to move, "had heard" (from the
N O that the tribe would be moved by force on 30 June. He
added, ingenuously, that Metz looked good "on the map" to
him and berated the Letsoalos for thinking "that Mr.
Ballinger is your government".
Thomas Ra'korra, accused of daily contact with Lisamore, found
the tribe turning on him, one day, at the khohla. It did not
surprise the tribe that he called on his * protectors' , the
HCs to defend him. <ll:'s:!>
Shortly after that, on 20 March, the CMC, Northern Areas,
S.J. Davis, entered the location with a 12 'European'
constables and 1 'non-European* constable, armed with
revolvers. Davis offered compensation for trees and houses,
to be paid on the tribe1s arrival at Metz. His real purpose,
like the abandonning of Pert ills, was to cut the costs of
the removal for NAP. This rverse shook the tribe. NAD might
build them no houses at Mets, but without compensation, they
would have no money to build their own shelters from the
wintry weather. As a final blow, the CNC wished to spend the
tribe1s banked savings on a truck to transport them to Mets.
In short, NAD expected the Mamathola to pay for their own
removal, and ultimate destruction as a community. At a
further meeting on 9 April, the tribe refused responsibility
for their own transport; they would go only in state
vehicles. ••"'•'•' Howevr, by 1 May, The Star trumpetd that half
the tribe <200 families) would move to Metz, with a £4 NAD
travel allowance. <41) The Star, heavily reliant on
government information, was getting a little ahead of the
facts.
To go back to the 9 Apr il meeting: the tribe understood
Davis' threats to reverse the Minister's promises of 5
October. The armed offensive made the Mamathola realise that
the removal would ruin them. Increasingly aware of their
power less ness, they clung to the issue of corapensation, so
crucial to their survival. They stood to lose 30,000 fruit-
bearing trees: orange, banana, n?.art j ie, pawpaw, peach,
guava, avocado, mango, lemon, grenadilla and mulberry. While
the tribe valued thtiir tr«es at £3 each, NAD was of f eri ng
them 10/-. Their fatal financial loss might be £75,000, <42)
40.HHB, Pet.Ax., El, "Kotule van Vargadering gehau in Mamathola Lokasie,
9/4/1957"t where the EC stated that all who travelled on the proposed tribal
lorry to >T«:tz would have their £4 transport compensation paid into the tribe's
account.
41.WQS, Clippings 1948-60, 1/5/1957, The Star "Half a Native Tribe to make
mass move".
42.KSE, BC347 C5 V.4.9, 25/3/1957 "A Report of the Meeting in Hamahlola's
Location with the CUC for tforthern Areas"; 4.10,26/3/1957, VGB to PL, advised
them to "stand out firmly" and call ISTAD's bluff; 4.12, 28/3/1957, VGE advised
them not to be^ iu legal proceedings unless thsy could get a very experienced
and sympathetic lawyer. KL&, Clippings 1948-60, 1/4/19-57, Golden City Post.
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Compensation and conservation were related issues: while WAD
could argue that removal was necessary to restore the eroded
soi l and ponges of the location, i t could not pr omise to
reconstitute the tribe on land equal to that of Ifemathola.
Even though NAD put out that Metz had 5,000 morgen of
" f i r s t -c lass farming land" i: "-'3 :' , a local farmer , wrote 'to The
Star to pronounce Metz, which he knew well, "dry, not and
scrubby, intersected with sandy water-courses with only
patche 5 of arable and irrigable land and all but
undeveloped". <44) Phineas wrote at once to Ballinger to deny
27AD1 s claims, affirm the le t ter , and inform him that the
tribe had engaged a lawyer to deal with the compensation
issue. The "Famous Lawyer", Basner entered the fray on 21
May 1957.
But before he could act, Young moved in. On 20 May, he
announced, at Kamathoia, that the removal had been brought
forward to 3 June, whether reaping were completed or not.
All meal ies and livestock v/ould remain behind and
compensation for trees was cut to 3 or 4/- . On hearing this ,
Ballinger urgently requested clarification from Eiselen. He
then cabled Phineas at Kensington Golf Club, to say "Have
done a l l possible but not very hopeful". Eiselen simply
referred the matter to his Pretoria office; no reply emerged
until well after the lorr ies had arrived to bear the tribe
to Metz. *: "•'•*:' The Senator had every reason to depair.
The removal began at 9 am on 3 June. NAD, with police
support, entered the location, while reporters watched from
aircraft . The tribe were told they must accept compensation
and begin moving. Same people, who later claimed ignorance
of their rights, did accept compensation. As the Chief was
about to accept his £24 compensation, the women of the tribe
tri«d to stop him. Violence was narrowly avoided. The NAD
men in charge, KC, Tzaneen, B. F. Lizamore, with H. F. Bosnian
and P. J. de Beer (CNC and Assistant NC, Northern Areas) ,
feared for their lives:
0ns blankes was heeltmaal omsingel en die ophitsende krete van die
vrouens het die mans aangespoer ora 'n astrante houding te
neem. c fJ'*-'
There was no th ing ' r o u t i n e 1 in t h e way the removal preceded.
The Maiaatho l a re fused t o move. This , dec l a r ed We i t z
cont ravened the Chief' s unde r t ak ing (20 May) t o lead the
t r i b e t o Metz " w i t h h i s k i e r i e " , t h e s i g n of h i s
a u t h o r i t y . <47)
43. ma, Clippings 1945-60, 1/5/1957, The Star "Half a Native Tribe to icake
mass move"; *&£, EC 347 C5 V 4.24, 21/5/1957, PL to WGB
44.2Q£, Clippings, 194S-60, 12/6/1957, The Star, Letter from Farmer, The Downs
Cnr. Metz), to Editor. KGE, BC 347 C5 V 4.24, 21/5/1957, FL to VGE.
Pol i t i c ians and press took up t h i s farmer"s c r i t ic i sm of Metz. See VGB
Clippings, 3/6/1957 Cape Tiiaes "Leader"
45. HSS, BC 347 05 V 4.30, 27/5/1957, PL to VGB; 4.31, 29/5/1957, VGB to
Eiselen; 4.32, 29/5/1957, VGB to PL; 4.33, 1/6/1957, VflME to VGB,
4Q.HEE, Pet . , Ax. J, Affid. 3/9/1957, B.F, Lizaraore, NC Tzaneen.
40. KiiB_, Fet. Ax E, 4/9/1957, P. V. Vei tz ' s Affid, para. 5
The tribe feared that the Chief, infirm of body and purpose
might unwittingly capitulate to the government, and tried to
rescue himbodily. The government, fearing he would not
capitulate, sent Young to the scene at 3.30 pus next day. He
found an "aggregation of. . . 150-200 natives. . .a large number
of whom were women...whose attitude was one of sullen
resentfulness", gathered around the Chief's kraal. The Chief
was "in consultation with his attorney ^Kr. Basner) outside
the Location. " Young asked Basner what his business was.
B.aaner replied it was to advise his clients of their legal
rights, Not to be cowed by the confident lawyer, Young added
sternly: "I then dismissed him and he left".
The Chief, whose willingness to take compensation Young read
ci& willingness to move, then "changed his mind". His
followers returned his belongings to his kraal. Young
concluded that the Chief had "changed his mind after having
consulted Mr. Basner". His attitude on 4 June was "a
complete volte face and breach of agreement". The Chief said
shamefacedly, Young reported, that he regretted Young's
"disappointment. I am willing to move to Metz; but I am
afraid of elements of my Tribe if I remove, they will murder
me. I am also afraid of the splitting up of the tribe."
The tribe feared that the Chief, infirm of body and purpose,
might unwittingly capitulate to the government, and tried to
rescue him bodily, The government* fearing he would not
capitulate, sent Young to the scene at 3. 30 pm next day. He
found an "aggregation of. . . 150-300 natives. . .a large number of
whom were women. . .whose attitude was one of sullen
resentfuiness", gathered around the Chief's kraal. The Chief was
"in consultation with his attorney CMr. Basner) outside the
Location. " Young- asked Basner what his business was. Basner
replied it was to advise his clients of their legal rights. Not
to be cowed by the confident lawyer, Young added sternly: "I
than dismissed him and he left".
The Chief, whose willingness to take compensation Young read as
willingness to move, then "changed his mind", His followers
returned his belongings to his kraal. Young concluded that the
Chief had "changed his mind after having consulted Mr. Basner".
His attitude on 4 June was "a complete volte face and breach of
agreement". The Chief said shamefacedly, Young reported, that he
regretted Young* s "disappointment. I am willing to move to Metz;
but I am afraid of elements of my Tribe if I remove, they will
murder me. I am also afraid of the splitting up of the tribe."
The Chief s firmness after the ' incident' may be read in two
ways: as rega i ned pu rpose, or cant i nu i rig f i rrnness. I f You ng • s
version was true, then, perhaps the Chief did repent of his
wavering, when the women accosted him. If the Chief s own
version was true, then his refusal of HAD's protection during
the removal bear out his constant opposition to the removal. He
also refused to meet Young two days later Desperate, and feeling
the key-man slipping through their fingers, Young reported
personally to Verwoerd in Cape Town. Thus fortified, he called
the tribe to a meeting on 20 June. '; A**:i
This time, he trled especially hard to justify NAD1s purpose to
the Kstmathola. He began, as the official rationalisation so
often did, with the necessity of saving land and water. In NAD
discourse natural resources always seemed to come before human.
This area must be preserved for afforestation purposes and for the
conservation of the water resources. No government lifces moving
people with all the attendant disorganisation. The inconvenience,
the trouble and unhappiness and the expense which is involved.
Young1a speech contained the main i ngredients of NAD1 s
1
 official' response to what they saw to be the tr i be's change of
mind. Despite their a priori decision to remove the tribe no
matter what, NAD had a need to justify its actions publicly.
They presented the ca-.-e as a series of 'fair' and 'free'
negotiations in which each side 'undertook1 to meet certain
condit ionts. But STAD' s prior conceptions of the nat i ve mii\d and
chiefly government plus its desperate need to appear 'fair1,
clouded its vision. Upon these 'blind spots1 NAD officials
fashioned these negotiations into a narrative sequence of
agreement and deceipt. In their version of bhe story amenable
NAD officials generously agreed to settlements, which the
perfidious Mamatholas repeatedly subverted.
4S. EUS, Pet. Ax B, 17/9/1957, C.B. Young's Affid. paras. 17-19.
I?
The officials giving evidence for NAD retrospectively made each
event a symbolic 'stage' in the progress of this narrative. For
example, The allegedly Joyous 'hymns' on 5 October, had sealed
the tribe's formal commitment to move in June. Young backed the
1
 some people' who had asked the NC s permission to move earlier
as uninvpeachably representative of the tribe's wishes. In this
v/ay, HAD could dispel! its draconian reputation and adver tise th
removal as a 'sensitive' response to the popular will,
Within this sequence, TTAI> cast itself in the persona of sorely-
tried parent reasoning with indecisive child. This imagery, the
very scaffolding of NA Reports and the Tomlinson Commission,
indicates the way in which NA officials imagined their
relationship to the 'Bantu'. Under the M'P, NAD increasingly
abandonned the alternately strict and indulgent paternalism of
the UP trusteeship, which had spoiled the Natives rotten.
Instead, it advocated stern discipline, which Natives as
children always undertand better and is better for them.
For a while, NAD played the patient parent; when the Mamathola
sought a way round the parental dictum and requested a
betterment scheme in their location, Young reminded the wayward
children that:
"You yourselves rejected such a proposal ...because you could not
live in such a small area, on vegetable production, and that there
was not enough room for your expanding people'"
The children's desires must be proved wrong where they clashed
with the parents' interests: "It is not in your interests to
1ive in a cramped place." VUen children would not heed their own
best interests', parents must invoke the 'rules' . A betterment
scheme on the tribe's own terms was in any case "... contrary to
policy... people in Native Reserves must live in properly
planned economic holdings C in order to farm properly; others can
live in planned villages].
When the stubborn children resisted all reason, the parents
invoked necessity: the place needed conserving. When the
children gave •necessity' no quarter the parents dropped all
pretence of reason, and reverted to discipline:
la any case the Government has already decided that the tribe should
move to Metz and you have agreed to this. I accordingly rejectE ed]
the request in the letter.
It is the basic tenet of patriarchal discourse that the father's
word be fi rial.
With discipline its watchword, NAD had the upper hand, and the
master code. The tribe had to grope its way through the mire of
unexplained procedure. Their questions showed their anger and
confusion. Must they pay Trust rents plus ordinary local and
general tax, when they moved to the trust farms? Young said not.
This would make their tenure at Mets identical to Hamathola.
They could even call Metz "new Mamatholas" . Why must they go on
the earlier date? They would have to move earlier because the
move would take so long. What would become of their ancestors's
graves? asked James Modibane. Two families 'would remain behind
to tend them, said Young. Teacher Juda Letsoalo warned that "You
will have to use force if you want us to go" . Young did not
respond then, but Juda received his answer: dismissal from the
Banareng School, in due course. "My heart is sore. I do not want
H
to move", said Benjamin Letsoalo. - Young did not bother to
respond. "On what basis is compensation paid?" demanded Jan
M a n g e n i . ''• fl-' •'
Of these questions that had long perturbed the tribe, this was
the most important. Itfone of the tribe knew how amounts had been
calculated, or how the value of their property and improvements
had been assessed. They knew that poor compensation and removal
to inadequate land, would undermine their moderate way of 1 if e.
"Same of us have lived here 15 years without wox"king for whites
and earned a good living", reported John Matshape. The way in
which NAD had rewarded the Rakomas told the tribe that political
allegiance and not land value was at the bottm of the
compensation riddle. The Rakomas had been well rewarded with
land and trading rights at >Iets.
But they were powerless to stop NAD undervaluing their farms.
Saul Haepa had been a member of the Mamathola delegation to
protest to NAD their removal to Fertilis in 1956, rejected his
amount of compensation. £300 compensation was too little. He
said " ek sal £2000 aanneem en dan geen moei 1 ikheid maak nie" .
The tribe also knew that the promise of payment at Me t-z only was
part carrot and part stick, to compel them to go. Juda Madabyane
insisted that he be paid bef oi e removal and that Government
lorries be used. ' v'° :"
After allowing these questions, Young clamped down. Only one
family had gone to Met^ by 20 June. Because che rest had
remained, the govermnen t would prohibit their ploughing, close
their -ichools and pa^, t of £ i^e, wit hold their pensions and depose
their chief. These final threats were intended to make all
waver-its see the value uf going to 'Pietx, Those who wanted to
move without the Chief could do so, said Young.
Solomon Letsoalo understood these threats and the discourse of
the negotiations:
Ve ere the children of the Goverameat. We iiiutv that theGovernment
can force us to move but some of us will go elsewhere. Vhy can not
we ue allowed to stay at Mama t hoi a and proclaim it a Eetterment
Ared...?
All Young's r»s>a:=Qii:= had not convinced Solomon; yet he knew that
li.i.3 people were as impotent as children to resist the
Government' s words and weapons. (.51)
V.
Solomon also saw that compensation was t ied to the question of
land values. The value of the laud was hotly contested. NAD -and
the t r ibe assessed the Kaiaathola's use of the land and
cotitr ibu tion to farming different ly . KAD, taught by the Native
Affairs and Tomlinsori Coiincissions, found ths so i l erosion so
advanced as to demand the community1 s removal. The t r ibe
acknowledged that many seasons of ploughing on the mountainside
49.HISE, Petition, Ax El, 17/9/1957, CB Young1 s Speech, p. 1-3.
SO.HMEi £SA, Ax. El, "tfotule van Vergadering gehou in JIaiaathola Lokasie 9/4/1957,
51. HUE, K3A, Ax. B2, Minutes of tlie Tzaneeu Meeting, 20/6/57.
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mi gilt have worsened the erosion, but denied that they menaced
the Lets i te le*s headwaters and sponges. (52) NAD concluded that
the t r ibe were poor farmers and needed to "be taught bet ter
methods elsewhere. P.S. Toerien, Chief NAD Agricultural Officer
in Pietersburg and member of NAD1-a Ad Hoc Committees for
investigating Metz, F e r t i l i s and Mafefe, affirmed that the
location was;
. . , baie verweer en in 'n bale swale toestand van 'n landboukundige
oogpunt bsskou. Die stam is baie onpraduktief en wend primitiewe
metodes van boerdery aan.
Moreover, the amount of land was insuff icient and uneconomic.
Toerien*s house to house survey of improvements to the land
became the 'authori ty ' for reckoning compensation. The t rees and
improvements, he said, had no value at a l l . Nevertheless, the
Minister recommended that a l l the Natives receive compensation
higher than the market value of their t r ees . Kany payments were,
he said, ex gj-atia. t: °o > Yet the t r i be attached great value to
their land. Solomon Letsoalo protested that he did not know how
Toerien had undervalued the t rees so grossly; he himself was
given a mere £422.11.4, for t rees worth at least £2000.00 and a
house and shed worth £150.00. Furious over the i r pal t ry
compensation, the t r ibe t r ied , via Basner, to repay these
arbi trary assessments of their land. Lisamore would not accept
Solomon' s .£422. 11.4, as, he claimed to have paid Solomon
£422.11.6! <54)
While the off icial view of 'Native farming' in Mamathola took
shape, confidentially, in Toerien's reports (and in secret
Department of Lands surveys), in public Verwoerd t r i ed to
b e l i t t l e the Mamathola farmers. His 12 June 1957 peroration
became a court document.
...wherever there is a l i t t le fountain, l i t t le pieces of land are
laid out...wherever they can plough a l i t t le piece of land, they
plough...tthere are! deep furrows next to the whole of the slope.
Repetition of ' l i t t l e ' s t resses the t r i b e ' s hopeless attempts, to
farm; repet i t ion of 'plough' suggests their obst incite devotion
to backward farming methods. Verwoerd the ' fa ther ' also had to
bring home the folly of their ways: if the land were "bettered",
as the tr ibe had requested, they would not be able to plough at
a l l , Blind stubbornness made them cling- to the i r h i l l s i de of
1800 murgen (500 of them cul t iva ted) , when he was offering them
5300 at M&ts. The Senate heard him offer the Mamathola housing,
larger grazing lands, and numerous benefits besides:
...each, one receives an economic unit...because we never give land
out in such a case upon which a family cannot live fully. . .such
people do not need to go to Johannesburg or Fretoria . . . to
supplement their earnings.
The rosy future Verwoerd was sketching may have led him to
ignore the p i t f a l l s of his plans: By the ea r l i e r removal date, 3
June, housing had not yet been supplied a t Metz; the 163 xnorgen
1st ASA, 16/10/1957, para.4;
53.HHB, KRA, Ax. K, P.S. Toerien's Affid. , para.2.
54, HWB, list ARA. , Ax. E, Oct. 1957, Solomon Letsoalo's Aff id, , para.O. The cheques
are in
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under summer irrigation and 120 under summer and winter, were a
fraction of the 5360, and hardly sufficient for all 400
Kamathoia families. The land suitable for double-harvests would
enable families to live on smaller plots. He later alluded
mysteriously to a total 328 raorgen under proper irrigation from
we11-constructed canals, and to show his generosity, promised to
lay down 40 morgen under citrus.
More sinister still, he did not add in public that he intended
to resettle only 189 families as farmers. The "non-boere", the
lazy "three-quarters", could 1 i ve in the rural vi1lage
<ultimately build by themselves) and labour on the nearby Native
Trust Schemes. He indicated that he wished to set up and control
a class of African commercial citrus producers for the Bantu
Markets " that are coming into being everywhere" . Hetz would be
but one of 60 villages in the region farming to this end. The
unspoken obverse of this plan would be the conversion of " non-
far mrs" into wage labourers for the government farms. Edward
Letsoalo recalls that, after the rmoval to Metz, even the Chief
(a " big man" ) , laboured f or 12/- a week on the govwrnment
orchard at Strassburg.(55) Like a father enjoining an adolescent
son to 'be A inan' , he added:
The Government doss not believes [sic! that tribes should be
pandered to by means of a continual spoonfeeding by the European
tax-payer and I would like them to learn to stand on their own two
feet. (56)
In this Senate speech, Verwjerd avoided the question of
segregated markets - perhaps fearing the political heat it might
generate. Yet, NAC Keports as far back as 1948 reveal that white
farmers' resentment of black competition in addition to NAD* s
apparent concern for conservation and African farming lay behind
the removal.
WAD' s approach to the Banareng farmers was ambiguous. On the one
hand, JfAC credited them wi th successful farming; on the other
NAD blamed them for threatening soil and water sources and, most
dangerously, neighbouring white farmers. Although this threat
was much denied in parliament, Nature 11sake (NTS) files
<•confidential') testify to the strong competition that the
Banareng, leading members of the Letaba Bantu Farmers' Co-
operative CLBFO offered to their struggling white competitors
In the Letaba District Farmers' Union.
The 1S4S NAC inquired into the "Problems and Complaints of the
European Population - especially the Farming Community - of the
Letaba District. . . - in regard to the Natives In the said
area". <57) This inquiry also noted the district1s increasing
attractiveness, since Dr Anecke had cleared it of malaria. Frior
to rued i cal conquest, bath the district's fertile and drought-
stricken pur Lions, had been "unsuitable for European habitation
aad unhealthy for Natives. "
55.Interview with Edward Letsoalo and Chief Willlam Letsoalo, 14/12/1987.
56.ilfi£, Extract from 12/6/57 Spasch of Minister of Native Affairs
57.Union oi SA. Report of the flative Affairs Commission for the period 1 January
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Having won the war against malaria, the white farmers commenced
another campaign: capturing the citrus, tropical fruits and
winter vegetable markets, to provide "suppllas for the nation's
larder". "Nation" here is reserved for whites only. The farmer £,
grouped into the LDFU hoped to establish separate markets i or
whitss and natives; native agriculture should In their view,
feed only ncitLves. (53)
Conf 1 ict b«tv;eeu whit& and African f arm's had arisen over
competition for resources and markets, After the conquest of
disease, a great influx of would-be commercial farmers (white
and black) into the area, produced land hunger, over-farming,
over-grazing and over-stocking. Erosion of soil and water-
resources followed. African farming communities, who had, like
the TCaraathola, initally settled on mountain slopes to avoid
malaria, were now often blamed for spoiling, at source, the
rivers flowing from those mountains. "Many places which were
formerly the sources of splendid waterstreams have byen so
destroyed that they appear as raw wounds on the face of this
majestic landscape" , observed the 5TA Commissioners. "These
places are crying out to the very heavens".(59)
In doing battle against these formidable official documents,
Basnet had noted that the 1937 NAC did not single out Mamathoia
as a worse case than all the other Native Locations, Solomon
Letsoalo was very suspicious of all Commissioners who, like
Toml inson, condemned his 1ocation without ha vi ng set f oat in it:
"conditions have changed entirely [since fclie 1937 and 1948
NACsi", because of the introduction of citrus farming into the
formerly malaria-ridden area. He added that allegations of the
location1s water source erosion and inadequate size "can be
proved untrue in any Court of law or before any -Select Committee
or Commission of Enquiry." The Chief supported this view, adding
that if erosion were an issue, the Mam&thola could happily
survive on citrus production without ever ploughing or keeping
cattle again. Both Letsoalos insisted that their location was
neither on the Letsi tele1 s headwaters nor eroding its sponges.
They cited another location in the district which had survived
as they proposed to do. <.6O)
While any threat to the supply of water must pelturb a farmer,
the racial profile of this conflict, not to mention the state's
support of white agriculture, locked the discourse of
'conservation' into the prevailing; discourse of apartheid. (61)
At this =itage, the 'state' through its arm, NAD, found itself
caught between the demands of the. white farraing electorate, and
Lhe broader problem which African agriculture posed. . The
attitudes of white farmers and officials during the K&mathola
case diverged: White fanners channelled their anger against
African competition into attacking the alleged destruction of
water sources by the very Africans who were outfarming them.
57.&AC., 1945-52, p, 13.
ri3.IIEB, File 1; SD Letsoalo, Ibid., pp. 3-5. HKE. "1st Applicant's Replying
Affidavit", para.4.
59. William Beinart, "Sail Erosion, Conservationist and Ideas about Development: a
Southern African Exploration, 1900-1960", I£AS, n, i; Oct. 19S4, is an initial
approach to tha discourse of conservation in relation to the political economy of
r>outli Africa,
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Simultaneously, official discourse, in the mouths of the .
Commissioners, "began to detail, with missionary fervour the need
£or a "strong policy of action and salvation" in regard to
African farming. C62) The Tomlinson Commission even struck a
humanitarian note "... we are dealing here with all facets of
human life In so far as they concern an important population
group and the areas they inhabit. " (63) This did not stop the
Commissioners from endorsing earlier calls for the Mamatholas1
removal.
The evidence suggests that the rival Letaba Bantu Farmers' Union
was producing enough to threaten the LDFU. Three million bags of
fruit were produced on four locations, three trust farms and two
tribally owned farms. <64) -Production figures for Kamathola
itself are relatively high. Solomon Letsoalo noted that the 400
Iiamathola families each living on 5 morgen produced " oranges,
avacadoes C sic] , mangoes, lemons, grenadillas, naartj ies and
paw-paws". Chief Malisela added that "Mamathoia is among the
most valuable stretches of land for citrus cultivation in
Tzaneen", Samuel and Mary Makwela, former residents of
Mamathola, now living in Lephephane, on neighbouring Craighead
Farm, both recall abundant annual crops. Edward Letsoalo, now
living dessicated at Metz, resorted, like his father, Solomon,
to Biblical imagery: "Mamathola was a Second Canana"
Even before citrus had become the focus of competition, the
LEFC s farming and marketing had offended the white farmers. In
1948, the LDFU had protested to the NAC and HAD about the LBFC s
'irresponsible' • overproduction of tomatoes. ft'ot only was 'the
Native hardly worth naming as a consumer of tomatoes' , but the
1400 boxes ' he' produced a day ware lowering the fruit1s market
price. ' He' should be taught to farm with a sense of racial
responsibility: to produce to " feed himself and his race"..
Moreover, w M te farmers were deeply suspicious of the activltes
of the SANT. The Trust' s aid to the LBFC only bolstered the
" vi ti3.t ing i nf 1 uence of the prof i t moti ve" in the Nati ve "at
Mils unripe stage". Presumably, the 'native's' profit motive
would be acceptable when the white farmers considered 'him'
ready to be pic'ked for labour on their lands.
Al thouvli Jiaria labour was important to these farmers, their pleas
were d I recteri towards segregation in agricultural markets. They
begged for separate ' European'. and ' non-European' markets,
i-X Lef ly tn keep the latter from competing with white farmers,
but not. necessarily to rule out the reverse. Indeed, farmers
62. M£, 1S48-50, p. 13.
t>3. Tomlinsan. p. 135,
e.4.&AlL Import, 1950/1, p.39,
05. To Solomon Letsoalo,5 morgen seemed an unusual amount, of land for a 'Native' in
the Letabd area. See SD Letsoalo "JJaboth1s Vineyard", p. 2. The Tomlinson Report,
however, gives veiy different averages for land per 'Bantu family': 36 morgen in
1900 in the Cape and Transvaal; 27 morgeu in Fatal and OEC. By 1952, the
respective figures were 23, 30, 22 and 27. Kamathola appeared to be drastically
below the average figure for the Transvaal, and yet to be doing very well: 3
million bags of fruit were produced by the LBFC in 1950/1 (NAD Report, 1950/1,
p.29); EHS, "1st Applicant's Replying Affidavit", 16/10/1957, para.&,
Interview with S. and K. Xafcwela, Lephephane, December 1957.
Interview with, E. Letsoalo and Chief Letsoalo, December 1987.
wished to wrest the marketing of tomatoes in Johannesburg,
Pretoria and Cape Town from 'Native ' dominance. Their motive was
"better markets" , and not the "f inancia l gain" of which they
accused, the i r black competitors. That they too wished for l inks
wi th the Trust suggests some envy of the LBFC s s t a t e
support. (6f>> This envy was undrstandable, Throughout the 1950s,
SA.NT had been paying vast sums for Transvaal land dest ined for
African farming; ' from £159, 258 in 1950 to £1, 218, 045 in
1957. <57)
By 1950, the Letaba Dis t r ic t . Farmer Union were openly ca l l i ng
for the Kamathola' s Removal, They demanded to know why the
removal to F e r t i l l s was being repeatedly delayed. The o f f i c i a l
reply was a t e r se : "administratiewe probleme", At t h i s time, _the
then Agricultural Officer Toarien had been- the voice of
moderation in NAD. As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on
F e r t i l i s , he thought a forced removal to t h i s in fe r io r farm with
i t s proposed xk mar gen p lo ts and lack of schools, v i l l ages and
churches "would only cause "verdere moeilikhede". Yet, these
problems did not stop him proposing small p lo t s for fami 1ies who
qualified as farmers, and herding them and those who did net
into r e s iden t i a l areas . This ' s e l e c t i o n ' would make i t possible
"om die non-boere u i t te s take1" . Toerien knew that , however
controversial , weeding out smaller from larger farmers was WAD's
only remedy for overstocking, erosion of land and water, and the
streamlining of native agr icul ture . (68J
Yet both the • t r i b e and ETAD knew that the removal s t ruggle was
not about farming alone. NAD i t s e l f had t i ed three a n c i l l i a r y
social issues into the struggle to lever the t r i b e out of t h e i r
location, Where d i rec t persuasion did not suff ice , KAD's
manipulation of basic services : post off ice, school, and
pensions eventually brokeg the t r i b e ' s r es i s t ance . From June
1957, NAD closed the post office at Mamatuola; a l l l e t t e r s were
diverted to Metz. Pensions were paid a t Metz. The two schools,
Eanareng and Mabileke were removed, without the consent of the
Mamathoia representa t ives on the cont ro l l ing body, • the Letaba
School Board.
The evidence makes the school ' s removal appear crucia l to NAD
plans draw the s t ing of the rural African i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ' s
' a g i t a t i o n ' . S t a t e ' s nominees, led by the Chairman Hudson
tftsanwisi, whose s t a r in .Native Affairs was in the ascendant,
55.Tomlinson, p.121, notes a great increase in the production of the LBCF; 1948-
1950 income was £9,21& and rose to £21,629 in 1951-2. The Report remarks on the
industry of tills co-operative in acquiring "a tractor, a lorry and other lighter
equipment". Both Samuel ftakwela and Edward Letsoala consider that threatened white
farmers' complaints to government about the Mamathola*s prosperity brought about
the removal. See interviews listed at note?.
57,IAD. Report, 1950, p.23, and 1954-7, p.47.
6S.SABS 10217, NTS, S/423 <25), 5/8/1956, L A Pepler for the Secretary of Native
Affairs to Brig, J P P Coetsee, Voorsitter Naturallesake Komitee, Letaba
Distriksboereunifc. SABB 10217, UTS, 8/423 (25)
 ( 2Q Say 1956, F S Toerien to the
Chief Native Corcmissioner Pietersburg. It is not clear whether he had the welfare
of the foircatliola at heart, or his own and his Department's'reputation:
Waar die verskuiwing deur ons geforsesr word, meet versigtigheid aan die dag gele
word sodat daar nia later set 'n vinger na ons gewys kan word rue
See SABS 10217, KTS, M 8/423 (25.), 10/8/1955, Toerien, Chief Educational
Officer, Fietersburg to Chief KC, Fietersburg,
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effected the schoo l ' s removal by ignoring the t r i b e 1 s recognised
represen ta t ives on the school-board. The removal Banareng School
teachers , l ike T. Matsete and Juda Letsoalo, accused of spread
propagating res i s t ance to the government, seem tohave been part
of t h i s plan. They were dismissed from the i r posts in terms of
the Bantu Education Act Amended, 1955, which held that any
tacher propagating view "detrimntal tothphysical mental or moral
welfar of thepupi ls . . .a t tending £a Bantu or Native school]
should be fined £50 or imprisoned for 6 months".(69)
Juda Letsoalo was apparently b lack- l i s t ed by BED. Although he
t r i e d throughout 1955 to get a post a l l over the Transvaal, no
other school-board would accept him. (70) The "weeding out" of
problematic teachers seems almost as important as weeding out
ine f f i c i en t farmers. I t will require much more research to show
how both s o r t s of cu l l ing came to play important par t s in taming
the countryside.
The Banareng would not be tamed or moved. On 22 August, they
were served with a Government Order driving them out of the
Second Canaan. The order s ta ted that as they had, on 5 October
1956, 9 April, 20 and 22 May 1957, undertaken to vacate
Mamathola for Met2 by 30 June and had fa i led to do so, they had
forfe i ted the r ight to occupy Mamatholci. from 1 August. They
would therefore be ejected from the location. The sender, the
TTC. Tzaneen, hoped that they would go quie t ly "and not force the
Government to resor t to the legal action indicated above". <!71)
NAD also t r i ed , but were unable, to effect the removal in terms
of Proclamation No.230/1957, an amalgam of Sections 25 of the
Native Administrative Act <1927> and Section 31 of the Native
Trust and Land Act (1935). The Chief and the t r i b e ins i s ted that
only Section 5 <1> b is of the 1927 Act could terminate the i r
r ight to l ive at M&mathola. Verwoerd then relinquished the
Proclamation and resor ted to ejectment under t h i s s t a tu te . (72)
Had the case cojne to t r i a l , the court of law would have had to
examine t h i s clause very careful ly:
The Governor-General may whenever he deems it expedient in the
general public interest, order the removal of any tribe or portion
thereof or any Native from any place to any other place within the
Union upon such conditions as he may determine: Provided that in the
case of a tribe objecting to such removal no such order shall be
given unless a resolution approving of the removal has been adopted
by both Houses of Parliament, . . . . .
Farliamentary r a t i f i c a t i o n was t h i s clause1 s Achil les ' heel, as
i t lnclu ded t he pr i nc 1 pie of a udi a i t era m part em whi ch
precedents a r i s ing from the 1955 Bantu Admi l i i s t ra t ion Act
Amendment removed. The amendment lodged the power to decide upon
the grounds of removal with the Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development. His and the Governor General 's decision
depended on the l a t t e r ' s 'good f a i t h 1 , and not necessari ly on
the accuracy of the information he acted on. Nor did the courts
69.H.M. Basner "The Black Price of South African Gold", p.207.
7O.ffiffi, Pile on Juda Letsoalo. See also Hfl&, RKA, Ax.0, 4/9/1957, Hudson
Ntsanwisi's Affid. Some idea of the restructuring of Black education can be
gleaned from questons In the Houseof Assembly. See Mil, 20/1/1956; 7/5/1957.
71-HHS. 1st ARA( Ax K, 22/8/1957, To the Banareng Tribe Occupying Mucfcle Glen.
1st ARA, 16/10/1957, para. 13, and RFKA, 17/4/1957, Ad. para.22.
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consider it politic to pass -judgement on an order of the
Governor General acting on the sole advice of the Minister. Had
the case ever come to argument, it would probably have fallen
victim to this law's new armaments. (73)
This statute extended the concept of the 'supreme chief' to whom
accrued the cumulative powers of all the ' paramounts' of the
African tribes. (His authority was based upon a dubious theorem:
the sum of the powers of all the paramount African chiefs would
be equal to the power of a Supreme Chief if he existed.) This
office was vested in the nominal chief white: the Governor
General, to enable him to govern by proclamation the many tribal
aud detriballsed and exempted natives " . -. . who, in many- cases,
- are the principal agitators in SA today. If you have the power
to t©move them from one place where they do mischief to a place
where they do not do mischief, what a useful provision that
would be". David Welsh notes that several cases in 1957 and 1958
fell foul of these newly improved laws. C74> Had the Mamathola
case come to court, it would probably have gone the way of these
precedents.
But the courts could not protect the Mamathola. From 5 to 12
March 1958, the SAP sealed off access to the location.
Government porters loaded residents' goods onto wai ting trucks.
After the removal of the goods, huts were set on fire or pushed
down by tractors. The tri be were carried in 4 0 government trucks
to Hetz. They could take no food with them; mealies, fowls, pigs
and goctttj were left behind and became food for the porters. The
move took place while the chief was In Pretoria. On returning,
he found his hut wrecked, and his axe, spear and £20 stolen.
When he complained, the Police Commandant told him not to waste
time and money in getting a solicitor to fight in vain, Basner
was indeed powerless to prevent the removal,
M«atz, the 'New Canaan', was mare like a wilderness. The farm was
fenced, and people could neither leave nor enter it without a
permit. The olimate was hot, the swampy ground wou id not support
fruit tn;;es and mealies, but only mil let. Having arrived without
provisions, each family was given a bag of mealies and 51b packs
of peanuts to last them a year. So the childrn went to school
hungry. Same became ill with malaria and died within a year. No
pensions were paid. People were forced to buy materials and
bu i Id. their own houses. Until these were bui 11, they 1 i ved on in
tents, without saying a word. "We have obeyed the removal order;
but we are dissatisfied in all removal aspects", Solomon
Letsoalo concluded.
The Case of Malisela and Solomon Letsoalo and the Banareng Tribe
versus the Union Government never came to court. Basner, their
lawyer was obliged to flee the country for Ghana in early 1960.
When I met Edward Letsoalo in December 1987 at Metz, he asked
when Basner was coming back to take up the case. I had to tell
hitu that the Famous Lawyer had died in1 1977, in Hereford,
73.Gilbert Marcus, "The Forced Keraoval of Tribes", Centre for Applied Legal
Studies, p.6.
73.0n pp.96-7, Welsh, Ibid, cites the cases of Mabe v. Minister of Uative Affairs
(1957 " (3) S.A.293 <T>, Joyi v The Minister of Eantu Aflffli, lustration ami
Development. 1958 (2) S. A. 210 <,C) and Mnlengwa v. The Secretary for Native
.airs. 1952 <i> S. A. 312 USD.
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England. Both his response to this news, and Essy Letsoalo' s
researches into the 'survival strategies' of those living at
YL^I'S indicate that life at Mamathola has assumed, in memory, the
quali ty of a second Canaan. (75) The removal itself demonstrated
that the South African state did not need to go through the
courts to drive the Mamathola from Canaan. In the context of the
1950s, this removal was one of the moments at which IT AD began to
graft the discourse of conservation onto the language of
apartheid. Armed with .this powerful discourse, HAD (later BAD)
officials were well equipped to redraw the map of rural South
Africa and to reshuffle its people into the occupations and
roles it had cut out for them.
75. E. K, Letsoalo "Survival Strategies in Rural Lebowa", MA Dissertation,
University of the Vitwatersrand, 1932.
